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STRETCHING RICO TO THE
LIMIT AND BEYOND
ALEXANDER M. PARKER
There are some instances when a law is just on its face and
unjust in its application.... [B]ut when the ordinance is
used... to deny citizens the First Amendment privilege of
peaceful assembly and peaceful protest, then it becomes unjust.'
INTRODUCTION
In 1970, finding that "organized crime in the United States is
a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that an-
nually drains billions of dollars from America's economy,"2 Con-
gress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (OCCA).'
Title IX of the OCCA, also known as the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),4 contains both criminal
and civil provisions that are designed to eliminate the influence of
organized crime on American business. Prior to 1980, RICO was
applied almost exclusively to criminal prosecutions.' Since then,
however, civil RICO suits have gone beyond the underworld of
organized crime and have become common in areas such as com-
mon commercial fraud, securities fraud, and antitrust violations.6
In recent years, there has been a great deal of concern among
commentators and practitioners that the application of civil RICO
has expanded well beyond its intended sphere-and, indeed, be-
1. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from the Birmingham City Jail, in A TESTA-
MENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 289, 294
(1986).
2. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922
(codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
3. 1&.
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1994).
5. REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE OF THE A.B.A. SECrION
OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAw 1, 55 (1985) (finding only nine deci-
sions involving civil RICO before 1980).
6. Id. at 57. The report noted that of the 300 civil RICO cases surveyed, 40%
involved securities fraud, 37% involved common law fraud in a commercial or business
setting, and 4% concerned antitrust or unfair competition.
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yond what is constitutionally permissible-particularly when ap-
plied to individuals engaged in what this Note refers to as "protest
activity."7 Focusing on the fact that RICO permits civil plaintiffs
to recover triple their provable damages, these critics argue that
the availability of such extraordinary damages will have an unac-
ceptable chilling effect on constitutionally protected speech. De-
spite this criticism, the courts have regularly ruled in favor of
broad interpretations of RICO.' In decisions defining its pattern
and enterprise requirements, the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts have stretched RICO to the broadest interpretation that its
statutory language can withstand.' °
To fully understand the extent of this reach, however, one
must look beyond RICO itself. Because of its structure, the
breadth of RICO is directly related to the breadth of its predicate
offenses, for without a predicate offense no RICO liability can
arise. This is because RICO liability extends only when the defen-
dant has engaged in a pattern of "racketeering activity" that is
itself defined in terms of other criminal statutes." These statutes
are collectively referred to as the "predicate offenses." Thus, if a
defendant's actions are not included within the scope of a predi-
cate offense, neither civil nor criminal liability is possible under
RICO.
When RICO is used against protesters, plaintiffs most fre-
quently use Hobbs Act extortion as the predicate offense.1 2 This
affinity exists because the courts have repeatedly extended the
Hobbs Act, like RICO, to cases beyond its originally intended
scope. The federal courts have rejected attempts to limit the
Hobbs Act through strict readings of "property" and what it
means to attempt to "obtain" property. 3 Similarly, the courts
have refused to impose either a principled definition of "fear"'4
or a narrow interpretation of "interstate commerce.' 15 Any of
these limitations of the Hobbs Act would protect those engaged in
7. In this context, protest activity refers primarily to picketing and sit-ins, but may
extend to other forms of nonviolent civil disobedience.
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994).
9. See infra Sections II(B)-(C).
10. Id
11. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1994).
12. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994).
13. See infra Section I(C).
14. See infra Section I(D).
15. See infra Section I(B).
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forms of protest activity generally thought to be protected, and
even necessary, as a matter of policy.
Thus, this application of RICO is dependent not merely on
one but two statutes that have been interpreted to their maximum
scope. This Note traces the extent of these expansions and warns
that at some point the tension of this "double-stretching" of RICO
and of its predicates must reach its breaking point before it can
reach peaceful protesters. Part I examines the judicial expansion of
Hobbs Act extortion, the predicate most commonly used against
protesters, through the broad reading of its three main elements.
Turning to the similar evolution of RICO itself, Part II discusses
how courts have consistently rejected attempts to limit its reach
through its pattern and enterprise requirements. Finally, Part III
analyzes several cases applying RICO and Hobbs Act extortion to
those engaged in political protest. This Part demonstrates that both
statutes must be read at their maximum scope before they reach
these types of activities. This combination results in a statute that
punishes behavior totally unrelated to its intended target.
There are many reasons for believing that the application of
RICO to protestors should not be permitted. Congress intended
that both RICO and the Hobbs Act address a particular class of
criminal behavior-organized crime. 6 It is nothing short of in-
credible that such statutes have been applied so far from their
primary target. This Note concludes that when pushed to this
absurd limit, the statutes are stretched too thin, and courts should
be unwilling to permit their application to protest activities. One
need only look at our history to understand the vital role that
political protest has played in American politics. From the Boston
Tea Party to the women's suffrage movement to the civil rights
movement, Americans have used public protest as a means of
effecting political change. It is not difficult to imagine what impact
RICO would have had on Dr. King's Southern Christian Leader-
ship Council. Segregationist forces could have used the extraordi-
nary damages provision to cut the financial legs out from under
the movement. When crimes have been committed, they should be
punished, but there is no need for the kind of severe penalty
RICO now imposes. Nonviolent, legal protest should not be sub-
ject to extraordinary punishment.
16. See infra Sections I(A) and II(A).
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I. THE PREDICATE OFFENSES-HOBBS Acr EXTORTION
RICO prohibits various actions involving racketeering activi-
ty." Such activity is defined as any one of a long list of state and
federal criminal acts, including violation of the Hobbs Act. 8 This
Act makes it a federal felony to attempt, conspire to, or actually
interfere with interstate commerce through robbery or extortion.
However, neither the language of the statute nor its legislative
history specify how broad a range of activity is covered by its
definition of extortion. 9 As a result, courts have permitted ambi-
tious federal prosecutors to apply the Act to situations quite dif-
ferent from the classic extortion scheme (e.g., a criminal threatens
to damage a shopkeeper's store if the merchant refuses to pay an
amount of money for "protection"), thereby extending federal
jurisdiction to crimes previously handled by state courts.20
This growth largely has resulted from broad interpretations of
the statutory language. The required effect on interstate commerce
is now merely a de minimis one. Similarly, courts have broadened
the types of rights considered property within the meaning of the
statute. Finally, the courts have also broadened the understanding
of what the statute means by fear, of what the victim must be
afraid, and of what connection the defendant must have in creat-
ing that fear.
A. Legislative History of the Hobbs Act
Of all the RICO predicate offenses, the Hobbs Act is by far
used most often in cases against peaceful protesters. Enacted in
1945, the Hobbs Act was a response to the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in United States v. Local 807, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters.2' In its holding, the Supreme Court overturned the
conviction of union members accused of using threats of violence
to obtain wages for no labor Congress passed the Hobbs Act
because some of its members believed that the Local 807 decision
17. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994).
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B) (1994) (cross-referencing 18 U.S.C. § 1951).
19. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994); S. REP. NO. 1516, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1946);
H.R. REP. No. 238, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1945).
20. See Camille Kenny, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction: A Case Against Making Federal
Cases, 14 SETON HALL L. REv. 574, 586-92 (1984).
21. 315 U.S. 521 (1942).
22. ld. at 531-39.
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had "legalize[d] in certain labor disputes the use of robbery and
extortion."'  The Hobbs Act did not seek to change the substan-
tive law of its predecessor statute, the Anti-Racketeering Act of
1934,24 but did remove its organized labor exemption.' Indeed,
although it is organized somewhat differently, the language of the
Hobbs Act is substantially similar to that of the Anti-Racketeering
Act. 6 The interpretive process is somewhat confused, however,
by a debate as to whether the Hobbs Act owes more to its prede-
cessor or to the New York Code? To further muddy the waters,
others have suggested that the language has a more general com-
mon law meaning. As Rep. Russell said in the House debate,
"There is no use defining those terms because they are so well
defined that their definition now is a matter of common know-
ledge."' Courts have done little to resolve this question, giving
New York precedent persuasive but not controlling authority.29
Torn between independent bodies of law, the legislative intent as
to the precise scope of what behavior constitutes extortion under
the Hobbs Act remains unclear.
The debate over the legislative history of the Hobbs Act
would be largely pointless if the statute had continued to be ap-
plied only to racketeers and organized labor because their activi-
ties would fall within almost any definition of extortion. Over the
years, however, the government has attempted to bring a broad
range of activities within the definition of extortion. These activi-
ties have included the actions of corrupt government officials and
23. 91 CONG. REc. 11,899, 11,900 (1945) (statement of Rep. Hancock).
24. Ch. 569, 48 Stat. 979 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994)).
25. See H.R. REP. No. 238, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., tit. III (1945), reprinted in 1946
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1360, 1370.
26. The Hobbs Act, for example, defines extortion as "the obtaining of property
from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force,
violence, or fear, or under color of official right." 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1994). The
Anti-Racketeering Act, on the other hand, has no explicit definition of extortion, but
punishes one who "[o]btains the property of another, with his consent, induced by wrong-
ful use of force or fear, or under color of official right." Anti-Racketeering Act, Ch. 569,
§ 2(b), 48 Stat. 979, 980 (1934).
27. For a more complete analysis of this debate, see Laurel G. Sandier, Note, Ex-
tortion "Under Color of Official Right". Federal Prosecution of Official Corruption Under
the Hobbs Act, 5 LoY. U. CHI. L. 513, 514-18 (1974).
28. 91 CONG. REc. 11,914 (1945).
29. See, e.g., Evans v. United States, 504 U.S. 255 (1992); United States v. Brecht,
540 F.2d 45, 52 n.12 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1123 (1977); United States v.
Nedley, 255 F.2d 350 (3d Cir. 1958).
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commercial extortion." A stream of judicial decisions has broad-
ened the statute and widened each element of a Hobbs Act prose-
cution to the point that the facts of extreme cases rarely even
resemble those in the classic paradigm.3'
B. Interstate Commerce
The first element of any Hobbs Act prosecution is the ob-
struction of interstate commerce or the movement of any article or
commodity in interstate commerce.' The definition 3 ties the ju-
risdictional element of the Hobbs Act to the full breadth of the
commerce power; and as the commerce power has expanded, so
too has the Hobbs Act.' The Supreme Court's decision in Sti-
rone v. United States supports this view: "[The Hobbs Act] speaks
in broad language, manifesting a purpose to use all the constitu-
tional power Congress has to punish interference with interstate
commerce .... ,3 That interference need not be severe, howev-
er. Indeed, courts have since held that there need only be a de
minimis effect on interstate commerce for the Hobbs Act to ap-
ply 6
30. See, e.g., United States v. Local 560, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267,
281-82 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986); United States v. Kenny, 462
F.2d 1205, 1229 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972); United States v. Hyde, 448
F.2d 815, 832-34 (5th Cir. 1971), cert denied, 404 U.S. 1058 (1972).
31. See, eg., United States v. Wright, 804 F.2d 843 (5th Cir.) (involving a prosecutor
who accepted money in exchange for non-prosecution of drunk drivers), eert. denied, 481
U.S. 1013 (1986); United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014 (8th Cir. 1978) (dealing with
state legislator who was paid to "speak favorably" about a firm), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1116 (1979).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1994).
33.
The term "commerce" means commerce within the District of Columbia, or any
Territory... ; all commerce between any point in a State ... and any point
outside thereof; all commerce between points within the same State through any
place outside such state; and all other commerce over which the United States
has jurisdiction.
18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(3) (1994).
34. But see United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), in which the Court re-
fused to permit this expansion for the first time in recent memory. For a general dis-
cussion of the expansion of the Commerce Clause, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5-5 (2d ed. 1988).
35. 361 U.S. 212, 215 (1960).
36. United States v. Phillips, 577 F.2d 495, 501 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831
(1978); United States v. Gambino, 566 F.2d 414, 418 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
952 (1978).
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As an evidentiary matter, some courts of appeals have held
the interstate commerce requirements to have even less conse-
quence than the term de minimis may seem to indicate. These
courts, including the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the First, Second,
and Ninth Circuits, have found that there need not be a showing
of any actual effect at all on interstate commerce-a "probable or
potential" effect is sufficient.37 For example, in United States v.
DiGregorio, the First Circuit held that although there was no
evidence showing that the victim's company was involved in any
actual or planned construction projects, it was enough that "the
extortion could be reasonably thought to interfere with probable
future interstate commerce. 38
As to the quality of the relevant evidence, the court explained
in a footnote that although the witness' "choice of the past tense
[in his testimony] to describe his company's municipal construction
work is somewhat ambiguous, we believe the prosecutor's use of
the present tense in his question fairly supports an inference that
[the victim] was describing the present business of Chick's [com-
pany]., 39 The court then reasoned that although no evidence
demonstrated that the protection money demanded would have
come from the company, the jury could fairly infer that the pay-
ment would in some way deplete corporate coffers.4 Thus, under
this "depletion of the resources"'" theory, any act that depletes
the resources of a company engaging in interstate commerce ob-
structs interstate commerce and is subject to Hobbs Act prosecu-
tion.
This kind of reasoning, however, allows courts to accept theo-
ries of obstruction that are attenuated in the extreme. One of the
best examples of this problem occurred in United States v. Wright
in which the Fifth Circuit held that the Hobbs Act applied in a
case involving a local prosecutor who attempted to extort money
from law firms in exchange for not prosecuting clients for drunk
driving:
37. Phillips, 577 F.2d at 501; United States v. DiGregorio, 605 F.2d 1184, 1190 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 937 (1979); United States v. Daley, 564 F.2d 645 (2d Cir.
1977).
38. DiGregorio, 605 F.2d at 1191.
39. Id at n.7.
40. d at 1192.
41. lId at 1190; United States v. Zemek, 634 F.2d 1159, 1173 n.20 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981).
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Irrespective of whether we are sympathetic with a result that
puts the federal government in the business of prosecuting petty
crime of purely local concern, we cannot say that the government
has failed to establish every element required by the Hobbs Act,
including a connection with interstate commerce . . . [T]he failure
to prosecute drunk driving increases the number of wrecks on
interstate highways. Wrecks on the highways impede the flow of
interstate commerce thereby establishing the required connection
between the extortionate conduct and interstate commerce. 42
Thus, the interstate commerce requirement of Hobbs Act extortion
is extremely broad and of little practical consequence. Almost any
act of extortion can be brought within the scope of the Hobbs Act
and be prosecuted as a federal crime.
C. Property
A more substantive element of Hobbs Act extortion is the act
of obtaining property from the victim.43 Like the interstate com-
merce requirement, this requirement also has seen a great deal of
expansion since the Act's initial passage. The first of these expan-
sions was the addition of intangible property to the Act's protec-
tion.
The classic extortion scheme is the demand for money in-
duced by the threat of violence to the victim. There is no appar-
ent reason, however, why the demand for less tangible property
should not be included within the extortion laws. Indeed, in sever-
al cases, courts have held that property rights as intangible as the
right to hire employees and to solicit customer accounts are suffi-
cient to invoke Hobbs Act protection."
The next step in the expansion of the definition of property
incorporates rights that more closely resemble civil liberties than
property rights. For example, the Fourth Circuit held in United
States v. Santoni that "the property extorted was the right.., to
42. United States v. Wright, 804 F.2d 843, 844 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1013
(1986).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1994).
44. United States v. Lewis, 797 F.2d 358, 364 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1093 (1987); United States v. Hoelker, 765 F.2d 1422, 1425 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1024 (1986); United States v. Nadaline, 471 F.2d 340, 344 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 411 U.S. 951 (1973); United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1075-76 (2d. Cir
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1021 (1970).
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make a business decision free from outside pressure;" extortion of
this right was sufficient to invoke the Hobbs Act.45 Perhaps the
most extreme case of rights held to constitute property came in a
Third Circuit decision that upheld the convictions of union officials
based on their depriving the union's members of their "right to
democratic participation" in the union.' The court cited a 40-
year-old state court decision for the proposition that "such rights
are 'as real and as needful of equitable protection, surely, as mon-
ey or chattels.' ""4 The court did not explain why a state's protec-
tion of these rights in equity should justify the federal gov-
ernment's protection of them with criminal sanctions, except to say
that the Hobbs Act was intended to incorporate "the common
understanding of the states."
Finally, a related line of cases has broadened the "obtains
property" requirement of Hobbs Act extortion by expanding the
understanding of what it means to obtain the property. These
cases have held that the key to extortion is not the defendant's
gain of the property49 but the victim's loss. In United States v.
Clemente, the Second Circuit set forth the clearest rationale for
this position by pointing out that "whether a Hobbs Act defendant
personally receives any benefit from his alleged extortion is largely
irrelevant.""0 Any act, then, that is wrongfully intended to induce
an individual to give up any right he may possess can meet the
second element of Hobbs Act extortion.
D. Fear
The third and final element of Hobbs Act extortion is that
the victim be induced to give up property through "wrongful use
of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear."'" Unfortunately,
45. 585 F.2d 667, 673 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979); see also
Zemek, 634 F.2d at 1174 (including the right to "make business decisions ... free from
wrongful coercion" in the definition of property).
46. United States v. Local 560 of Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 780 F.2d 267, 282 (3d Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
47. Id. at 281 (citing Dusing v. Nuzzo, 29 N.Y.S.2d 882 (Sup. Ct. Ulster County),
modified on other grounds and affd, 31 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1941)).
48. Il
49. See United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415, 420 (1956); United States v.
Provenzano, 334 F.2d 678, 686 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 947 (1964).
50. 640 F.2d 1069, 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 820 (1981).
51. 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1994). Note that fear is not a required element when the
defendant is a public official and the inducement is "under color of official right." See
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the statute provides no definition of fear, thus leaving open ques-
tions about what fear is, what the victim must be afraid of, and
what role the defendant must have in creating that fear. The most
commonly used definition of fear is "a state of anxious concern,
alarm, or apprehension of anticipated harm."' 2 To date, however,
courts have succeeded in defining fear only by identifying what it
is not. For example, in a case involving the hiring of a state legis-
lator to speak favorably about a firm, the court held that the
official's subsequent demand for 10% of any resulting contracts
was not extortionate because the firm was "a willing collaborator"
and the principals "all expressed anger, not fear, at hearing of
Rabbitt's ten percent demand."' 3 The court seems to have been
persuaded by the fact that the only thing the firm stood to lose by
refusing the demand was the benefit of its existing agreement.-
Similarly, the Second Circuit found in United States v. Capo
that a job-selling scheme involved no extortion because there was
"no evidence at all to suggest that it would have been reasonable
for the 'victims' to believe that if they did not pay, the defendants
would exploit any such power to diminish their employment op-
portunities."' Once again, the suggestion here is that the victim
must believe that failure to participate will have some harmful or
preclusive effect for the fear element to be met.
As to what the victim must fear, courts established early in
the history of the Hobbs Act that the victim does not have to be
afraid of physical harm for extortion to exist. They accepted that
United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205, 1229 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972).
In these cases, the government can satisfy its burden by showing that the victim acqui-
esced to the demands because of the defendant's position. The Kenny court held that
"while private persons may violate the statute only by use of fear and public officials
may violate the act by use of fear, persons holding public office may also violate the
statute by a wrongful taking under color of official right." Id. at 1229. While courts
largely have adopted this position, commentators remain divided. See generally Thomas H.
Henderson, The Expanding Role of Federal Prosecutors in Combating State and Local
Political Corruption, 8 CuMB. L. REv. 385 (1977); James P. Fleissner, Prosecuting Offi-
cials Under the Hobbs Act: Inducement as an Element of Extortion Under Color of Offi-
cial Right, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1066 (1985); Note, supra note 27, at 515-18 (discussing
the past and present application of the Hobbs Act to corrupt public officials).
52. E.g., United States v. Brecht, 540 F.2d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1976), cerL denied, 429
U.S. 1123 (1977); United States v. Bryson, 418 F. Supp. 818, 825 (W.D. Okla. 1975);
Kenny, 462 F.2d at 1229.
53. United States v. Rabbitt, 583 F.2d 1014, 1027 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 1116 (1979).
54. 583 F.2d at 1027 n.25.
55. 817 F.2d 947, 951 (2d Cir. 1987) (en banc).
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the fear of "economic loss" would meet the fear requirement:
This view is interpreted broadly and has been held to encompass
not only certain future economic loss such as the termination of
contracts but prospective opportunities as well.'
Courts recently have gone one step further and found that the
defendant need not even be responsible for the harm the victim
fears. On the contrary, the defendant merely has to take advan-
tage of the circumstances and the victim's fear. For example, in
United States v. Duhon, the Fifth Circuit held that when the victim
faced impending labor difficulties, "[t]he crucial issue is whether
defendants intended to induce the $5,000 payment by exploiting
Buckholtz's fear of economic loss [caused by picketing] ... . The
defendant need not have originally caused the fear, nor need the
cause of the fear itself be wrongful. 58
At least one court has gone even one step further and found
extortion when the source of the victim's fear was the general
economic climate. In United States v. Shine, the court permitted a
conviction on the basis that the victim paid the defendant to keep
a construction contract because little other construction work was
available in the area. 9 Moreover, the defendant does not need to
have the ability to prevent the anticipated harm; rather, the victim
merely needs a reasonable belief that it is so.'
The great problem with these rulings, however, is that they
render the fear requirement practically meaningless. Decoupling
the defendant from the victim's fear destroys an essential charac-
teristic of the offense. Under the broadest interpretations, it would
be possible to satisfy the fear element in any case in which the
victim pays money to the defendant; after all, the victim would not
pay anything if he were not afraid that it would somehow be
worse not to.
56. See, e.g., United States v. French, 628 F.2d 1069, 1072 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 956 (1980); United States v. Duhon, 565 F.2d 345, 351 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 435
U.S. 952 (1978); Bianchi v. United States, 219 F.2d 182, 189 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 349
U.S. 915 (1955); United States v. Dale, 223 F.2d 181, 183 (7th Cir. 1955).
57. See United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 395-96 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 819 (1976); United States v. Brecht, 540 F.2d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1123 (1977).
58. 565 F.2d 345, 351 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 435 U.S. 952 (1978); see also French,
628 F.2d at 1072.
59. 526 F. Supp. 717, 719 (E.D.N.Y. 1981).
60. See United States v. Capo, 817 F.2d 947, 951 (2d Cir. 1987) (en banc).
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These cases demonstrate that each element of Hobbs Act
extortion has gradually been interpreted to its maximum breadth.
In part, this growth can be justified because there is always a final
check on its application-prosecutorial discretion. Federal prose-
cutors are subject to significant political controls, and elected gov-
ernmental officials are in a position to rein in any overzealous
application of the Hobbs Act. When applied in its incarnation as a
civil RICO predicate, however, there are no politically answerable
individuals through whom the statute will be applied, and any lit-
igant can utilize the breadth in the statute for his own personal
gain.
II. RICO
The breadth of RICO61 stems from the elusiveness of its in-
61. Selected provisions of the statute that apply to civil claims include the following:
Definitions:
(1) "racketeering activity" means ...(B) any act which is indictable under any
of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code . . . section 1951
(relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion).
(4) "enterprise" includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or
other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity.
18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1), (4) (1994).
Prohibited Activities:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income de-
rived . . .from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an
unlawful debt.., to use or invest . . . any part of such income . . . in acqui-
sition of any interests in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise
which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce ....
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activi-
ty... to acquire or maintain . . . any interest in or control of any enterprise
which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any en-
terprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of
unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the pro-
visions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d).
Civil Remedies:
(c) Any person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of
section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate United States
district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost
of the suit, including reasonable attorney's fee.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
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tended target. Its legislative history reveals that Congress was con-
cerned that an overly narrow statute would be ineffective in com-
bating organized crime as intended.62 In the end, these concerns
influenced the final version of the statute more than the concerns
that the statute was overbroad.63 In retrospect, it appears that
these critics had a legitimate concern. The two aspects of the stat-
ute that the supporters relied on as limiting RICO's scope have
been broadened repeatedly. On the one hand, the Supreme Court
has refused to permit lower courts to interpret the statute's "pat-
tern" requirement to require anything more than the minimum
that the language of the statute clearly implies.' On the other
hand, the Court has read the statutory "enterprise" requirement in
the broadest manner, repeatedly rejecting lower court attempts to
reduce RICO's breadth by narrowly construing its requirements.'
A. Legislative History
Much of the debate over RICO's application stems from its
potentially broad scope. After RICO was introduced into the Sen-
ate, some were concerned that it could apply not only to the Ma-
fia and other kinds of organized criminals but also to political
protesters.66 In part, this overbreadth arises from Congress's deci-
sion to attack organized crime based not on what it is, but on
what it does.67 RICO's supporters, however, argued that this
broad interpretation was necessary if RICO was to be applied
effectively to organized crime: "It is self-defeating," argued RICO's
Senate sponsor, Senator McClellan, "to attempt to exclude ... all
62. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
64. See infra Section II(B).
65. See infra Section II(C).
66. See Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hearings on S. 30 and Related Mea-
sures Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 475 (1969) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] (testimony of
Lawrence Speiser, Director, Washington Office, ACLU); see also Adam D. Gale, Note,
The Use of Civil RICO Against Antiabortion Protesters and the Economic Motive Require-
ment, 90 CoLUM. L REv. 1341, 1357-68 (1990).
67. This decision may have been based, at least in part, on a concern that to do
otherwise would make the law unconstitutional as a criminal sanction based on status.
See A.B.A. SECTION OF CORP., BANKING & BUSINESS LAW, REPORT OF THE AD Hoc
CIVIL RICO TASK FORCE 90 (1985); see also Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290,
299-300 (1961); Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 458 (1939). In any case, regardless
of the reason, this decision by its drafters has been the key to RICO's subsequent ex-
pansion.
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offenses which commonly are committed by persons not involved
in organized crime." 6 It was clear that RICO would be ineffectu-
al as a deterrent if it did not include offenses such as murder,
drug buying, or obstruction of justice-that is, the most common
organized criminal activities. It was not clear what, if anything,
should be done about the statute's overbreadth.
One of the first objections to RICO's scope came from the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). In hearings on Senate
Bill 1861 (a forerunner of the final RICO bill which defined rack-
eteering activity as "any act involving the danger of violence to
life, limb or property, indictable under State or Federal law and
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year"), 9 the
ACLU objected that "offenses of the kind [that] resulted from the
demonstrations in connection with the anti-war protest movement
could fall within the definition of pattern of racketeering activity
of the bill."70 Further objections to RICO's scope came from the
Department of Justice, which contended that the definition was
"too broad and would result in a large number of unintended
applications."71 The Department of Justice also suggested its own
model, which enumerated the generic classes of crimes covered. 2
In response to these objections, the Senate Subcommittee
changed the definition to conform with the Department of Justice
model. Congress ultimately enacted this form of the statute.73
While this change seems to have been an attempt to narrow
RICO's scope, it apparently was not a response to the ACLU's
objections.74 Indeed, the ACLU reiterated its concern about the
breadth of the statutory language during the subsequent House
Hearings.75 However, this time the ACLU did not mention the
68. 116 CONG. REC. 18,940 (1970).
69. S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1969); see also 115 CONG. REc. 9569
(1969).
70. Senate Hearings, supra note 66, at 475 (testimony of Lawrence Speiser, Director,
Washington Office, ACLU).
71. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 121-22 (1969).
72. See id. at 121-22, 158.
73. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (1994).
74. See 116 CONG. REc. 852-56 (1970) (text of letter written by ACLU to Senate).
75. Organized Crime Controk Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals Before the
Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 505 (1970)
[hereinafter House Hearings] (testimony of Lawrence Speiser, Director, Washington Of-
fice, ACLU) (criticizing the statute's enabling of grand juries to offer reports without
indictments as an unconstitutional compromise between the grand jury's power to indict
and the protection of a state official).
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potential application to antiwar protesters, but instead focused on
the possible application of RICO to simple drug purchase or pos-
session.
The meaning of the congressional response is unclear. Much
evidence, however, suggests that the legislature did not believe
RICO would apply outside the bounds of organized crime. The
Senate Committee Report is one of the best indicators of what
Congress thought RICO meant when it passed the OCCA. For
example, in its Statement of Findings and Purpose, the report
focused exclusively on organized crime and the effect that it has
on legitimate businesses, industries, and the economy of the entire
nation.' The exclusive focus was on the source of organized
crime's power-money. Further, RICO had been designed to stop
organized crime's infiltration of legitimate organizations. 78 RICO
was intended to meet the need for "new approaches that will deal
not only with individuals, but also with the economic base through
which those individuals constitute [a threat to] the Nation. In
short, an attack must be made on their source of economic power
itself, and the attack must take place on all available fronts.279
Thus, RICO was essentially an attack intended to cut the legs out
from under organized crime and other racketeers.
Finally, there is significant evidence from the congressional
debates that at least some legislators believed that RICO was
clearly intended only for use against organized criminals.' At one
point, Senator McClellan argued that "[u]nless an individual not
only commits such a[n enumerated] crime but engages in a pattern
76. House Hearings, supra note 75, at 499. On this point, the ACLU was joined by
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York (ABCNY). Id.
77. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). The Report reads:
The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly
sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of
dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of
force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its
power through money obtained from such illegal endeavors [sic] as syndicated
gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and
distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social
exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and
corrupt legitimate business and labor unions. ...
hlL
78. 1i at 76-77.
79. Ma at 79.
80. 116 CONG. REC. 846 (1970) (arguing that Dr. Benjamin Spock's antiwar protests
would not be covered by RICO because his actions "would not normally be considered
organized crime").
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of such violations, and uses that pattern to obtain or operate an
interest in an interstate business, he is not made subject to pro-
ceedings under Title IX [RICO]."'" Another RICO supporter,
Representative Poff, told his colleagues that RICO "does not
violate the civil liberties of those who are not engaged in orga-
nized crime, but who nonetheless are within the incidental reach
of provisions primarily intended to affect organized crime. '
There are a number of possible explanations for this apparent
lack of concern on the part of RICO's supporters for the threat
posed by the statute's broad language. One explanation, which
RICO advocates espouse today, is that Congress deliberately con-
structed the statute to be a broad and powerful weapon that could
be applied far beyond its central purpose.83 A better explanation,
however, and one more in line with the totality of the legislative
history, is that Congress believed RICO's overbreadth to be mere-
ly incidental; the pattern and enterprise requirements, moreover,
helped check its potential for over-application. 4 The courts, how-
ever, have interpreted these features to their maximum breadth.
As a result, the overbreadth feared by the ACLU and other early
RICO opponents has been realized.
B. Pattern Requirement
Each subsection of RICO's section 1962 requires a "pattern of
racketeering activity."'  "[A] 'pattern of racketeering activity' re-
quires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which oc-
curred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which
occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment)
after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity."'
From the outset, however, courts believed that the use of the
phrase "requires at least" instead of the word "means" implied
that more would be required.' Indeed, the legislative history
clearly supports this view. The Senate Report explained that "the
81. 116 CONG. REC. 18,940 (1970).
82. 116 CONG. REC. 35,344 (1970).
83. See Michael Goldsmith and Penrod W. Keith, Civil RICO Abuses: The Allega-
tions in Context, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 55, 73-75 (1986).
84. See infra Sections II(B)-(C) (discussing these constraints); see also Antonio .
Califa, RICO Threatens Civil Liberties, 43 VAND. L. REV. 805, 816 n.64 (1990).
85. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (1994).
86. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1994).
87. See eg., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Irex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 496 n.34 (1985).
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target of [RICO] is thus not sporadic activity. The infiltration of
legitimate business normally requires more than one 'racketeering
activity' and the threat of continuing activity to be effective. It is
this factor of continuity plus relationship which combines to pro-
duce a pattern."'
It was this phrasing which the Supreme Court seized upon
when it addressed what else section 1961(5) required. In H.J., Inc.
v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., phone company customers sued
Northwestern Bell, alleging that it had bribed state regulators.89
The trial court dismissed the suit, finding that each act was part of
a single scheme and did not constitute multiple schemes as it be-
lieved RICO required;' the Eighth Circuit affirmed.91' The Su-
preme Court did not adopt the multiple schemes approach and in-
stead found that two or more predicate acts constituted a pattern
when they met the tests of "relatedness" and "continuity."' ' Writ-
ing for the Court, Justice Brennan explained that these were two
distinct tests, and though their proof might overlap, they both
must establish a pattern.93
To define relatedness, the Court looked at Title X of the
OCCA.94 That provision defined a pattern of racketeering activity
as "embrac[ing] criminal acts that have the same or similar purpos-
es, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or
otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are
not isolated events." 95 The Court believed that the Congress, in
passing both statutes, had essentially the same thing in mind when
it spoke of a pattern.96
No related statutes, however, provided the Court with any
insight into Congress's conception of continuity. The Court ex-
plained continuity as essentially a "temporal concept" that comes
in two varieties: closed and open-ended.' Closed continuity
means that one must prove "a series of related predicates extend-
88. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1969).
89. 648 F. Supp. 419, 420 (D. Minn. 1986), affd, 829 F.2d 648 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'd,
492 U.S. 229 (1989).
90. Id. at 425.
91. 829 F.2d 648, 650 (8th Cir. 1987), rev'd, 492 U.S. 229 (1989).
92. 492 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1989).
93. Id. at 240.
94. hL at 239-40.
95. 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e) (1988).
96. H.J., Inc, 492 U.S at 240.
97. Id at 241-42.
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ing over a substantial period of time."9' Open-ended continuity
was somewhat more limited, requiring that the predicates establish
a threat of long-term (i.e., more than weeks or even months) rack-
eteering activities because they are part of an ongoing business or
are the regular method of conducting the enterprise. 9
The final result of the decision in H.J., Inc. was to leave the
pattern requirement as broad as possible while still providing guid-
ance to juries and trial courts."° It has greatly broadened the
scope of RICO in courts of appeals, such as the Eighth Circuit,
that had previously adopted additional pattern elements.
C. Enterprise Requirement
The meaning of enterprise has followed a similar path in the
courts. While explicitly defined in section 1961(4) as "includ[ing]
any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
although not a legal entity," '' courts have developed numerous
interpretations of its precise meaning."°
In United States v. Turkette,'0 3 the Supreme Court settled the
debate over whether RICO included both legitimate and illegiti-
mate enterprises. The Court noted that the First Circuit had relied
on ejusdem generis, the rule of construction saying that when gen-
eral terms are followed by a specific enumeration of examples the
general term should be interpreted so that it is limited to things
similar to those enumerated."4 The Court rejected this reasoning,
finding that the appellate court had attempted to use the specific
enumeration of legitimate business to limit the more general lan-
guage describing a second category of enterprises that included il-
98. Id. at 242.
99. Id at 241-43.
100. Justice Scalia, however, believed that the H.J., Inc. decision provided little direc-
tion at all. In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia opined that in light of the then-exist-
ing disparity in lower court opinions on the meaning of pattern, the Court's definition of
"continuity plus relationship" would be about as useful as the phrase "life is a fountain."
Id. at 252 (Scalia, J., concurring).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1994).
102. See, eg., United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193 (3d Cir. 1992); United States v.
Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988); Schaffer v. Williams,
794 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983).
103. 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
104. Id. at 581.
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legitimate enterprises; 5 that is, "enterprise includes any union or
group of individuals associated in fact. On its face, the definition
appears to include both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises
within its scope."'"
In the years after Turkette, the lower courts continued to
develop rules for determining the elements of a RICO enterprise.
The Third and Eighth Circuits have been particularly active in
outlining the characteristics of a RICO enterprise."° These cir-
cuits have identified three traits that all RICO enterprises share.
First, an enterprise has a common purpose toward which the mem-
bers all work."° Second, an enterprise has an ongoing organiza-
tion and structure. It includes a structure within the group for
making decisions that may be hierarchical or consensual but will
be more than merely ad hoc."° The structure also includes a
continuous organization of the members such that each person has
a role that furthers the purpose of the enterprise."0 While the
ongoing nature of the structure requires a continuity of personnel,
it does not mean that the continuity must be absolute."' An en-
terprise does not dissolve with the loss or replacement of a single
member; nor is it absolutely true that two predicates committed by
different sets of individuals cannot be part of a single enter-
prise.' The key is whether there is a continual, discernible
structure to the organization."
The third characteristic of an enterprise is that it has an "exis-
tence beyond that which is necessary merely to commit each of
the acts charged as predicate racketeering offenses."" In other
105. ld. at 581-82.
106. ld. at 580.
107. See, e.g., United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114
S. Ct. 1660 (1994); United States v. Leisure, 844 F.2d 1347 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488
U.S. 932 (1988); United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 849 (1983); United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1040 (1982); United States v. Lenmm, 680 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 110 (1983). But cf. United States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193 (3d Cir. 1993); United
States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988); Schaffer v.
Williams, 794 F.2d 1030 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983).
108. Lemm, 680 F.2d at 1199.
109. Riccobene, 709 F.2d at 222.
110. Console, 13 F.3d at 651.
111. Lemm, 680 F.2d at 1199.
112. See id. at 1199-1200.
113. See id. at 1199.
114. United States v. Riccobene, 709 F.2d 214, 224 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
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words, a RICO enterprise is something more than a mere conspir-
acy to commit a predicate offense. This element, however, may be
satisfied by the organization's existence as an ongoing planning
body that oversees and directs the commission of predicate offens-
es.
115
In addition, some circuits found another characteristic of RI-
CO enterprises that was particularly significant in cases involving
social protesters. This element was an economic or profit motive.
For example, in United States v. Flynn, the Eighth Circuit held
that "[f]or purposes of RICO, an enterprise must be directed to-
ward an economic goal.""' 6 The economic motive requirement
relies on the different roles of enterprise in section 1964(a) and
(b) and its role in section 1964(c)."7 These courts found that the
enterprises under subsections (a) and (b) are clearly economic en-
tities. Therefore, they inferred that subsection (c) must also require
an economic organization." 8 However, the Supreme Court re-
cently overturned those decisions in National Organization for
Women v. Scheidler."19 The Court found that the express lan-
guage of the statute clearly suggested different uses of enterprise
among the subsections, and that nothing in the legislative history
conclusively pointed otherwise."2
Thus, as with the pattern requirement, the judiciary has inter-
preted the enterprise language of RICO in its absolute broadest
manner. Indeed, the most restrictive element of the enterprise
requirement is the separation of enterprise from pattern. This
serves to differentiate RICO from ordinary conspiracy, but in this
form it does nothing to minimize the statute's recognized over-
breadth as the drafters seem to have believed it would.
U.S. 849 (1983); see also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981); United
States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d 1193, 1200-01 (8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 110 (1988).
115. See Riccobene, 709 F.2d at 224.
116. 852 F.2d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 974 (1988); see also Nation-
al Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 968 F.2d 612, 626-29 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct.
798 (1994); United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1983).
117. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1994); cases cited supra note 36.
118. Ivic, 700 F.2d at 60-61; Scheidler, 968 F.2d at 626-29.
119. 114 S. Ct. 798, 806 (1994).
120. Id. at 804-05.
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III. APPLICATION TO POLITICAL PROTESTERS
Although there have been recent applications of RICO to
other political protesters,' the most prevalent application of civ-
il RICO to protesters is in the national debate over abortion.
Given this fact and that the abortion cases present some of the
most extreme examples of RICO's application, this Note focuses
on these cases. It also draws parallels to other areas of political
protest.
A. Hobbs Act and Predicate Offenses
1. Interstate Commerce. Given the breadth of the interstate
commerce requirement, it seems unlikely that this requirement
would ever pose a difficulty to plaintiffs, even though the
connection is extremely tenuous in many cases involving protesters.
Indeed, a survey of the reported cases reveals that no protester
defendants have argued successfully that their activities did not
affect interstate commerce. Two brief examples illustrate this point.
In Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue,' the defendants
argued that the plaintiffs failed to show that defendants had ad-
versely affected interstate commerce. In its decision, however, the
trial court completely ignored this argument, relying instead on the
defendants' lack of an economic motive."z Similarly, the Third
Circuit showed an equal lack of concern for the interstate
commerce issue when it decided Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v.
McMonagle.24 In that decision, the court disposed of both the
Hobbs Act and the RICO interstate commerce questions in a
single short footnote: "[T]here was ample evidence that the Center
[plaintiff], a profit-making institution, advertised in interstate
commerce and drew patients from other states, thereby satisfying
121. See, e.g., Avirgan v. Hull, 691 F. Supp. 1357, 1359-60 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (involving
a bombing that targeted a Nicaraguan opposition leader), aff'd, 932 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1048 (1992); Walden Book Co. v. American Family Ass'n of
Fla., Inc., No. 89-2426 (S.D. Fla. filed Oct. 31, 1989) (charging the defendants with extor-
tion for threatening to publicly label Playboy magazine as obscene); Penthouse Int'l v.
American Family Ass'n of Fla., Inc., No. 89-2526 (S.D. Fla. filed Nov. 14, 1989) (ad-
dressing the same issues as to Penthouse).
122. 792 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1992), vacated in part, 991 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert
denied, 114. S. Ct. 185 (1993).
123. Id. at 168.
124. 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).
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the RICO interstate commerce requirement."'" In light of cases
like these, the interstate commerce requirement appears to be little
more than a pleading formality.
2. Property. Plaintiffs generally have relied on the broadest
interpretations of property to successfully bring RICO claims
against defendant protesters. Once again, the McMonagle decision
serves as a case in point. In that decision, the Third Circuit looked
to decisions such as United States v. Local 560,' United States v.
Santoni,"'2 and United States v. Zemek" for the proposition
that "[r]ights involving the conduct of business are property rights"
within the meaning of the Hobbs Act.129 In McMonagle, the
rights in question were the right to continue to provide abortion
services; the right of employees to continue their employment with
the clinic; and the patients' right to contract with the Center.3
And while defendants in these cases have protested that they
sought no property,3 the courts seem to favor the plaintiffs in
these cases.' 32
Some would suggest that Town of West Hartford v. Operation
Rescue halted the expansion of the property element.33 In that
case, the town claimed that protesters had extorted "from the
Town its ability to protect the rights of the Center, its patients,
and the Town's citizens."'" The town's claims were dismissed on
appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that
the protesters had obtained no property from the town.35
Finding that almost any action by the defendants might result in
activity by the government, the Second Circuit reasoned that "[i]t
125. Id. at 1349 n.6.
126. 780 F.2d 267, (3rd Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1140 (1986).
127. 585 F.2d 667 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 910 (1979).
128. 634 F.2d 1159 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 916 (1981).
129. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1350.
130. Id.
131. See Brief for Respondents Joseph M. Scheidler, Andrew Scholberg, and the Pro-
Life Action League, Inc. at 6, National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798
(1994) (No. 92-780).
132. See supra Section I(C).
133. Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 371 (D. Conn. 1989),
vacated, 915 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1990).
134. Id at 376.
135. Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 915 F.2d 92, 99-104 (2d Cir. 1990).
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is simply not tenable to translate the activation of such a response
into a Hobbs Act obtention of property." '136
This decision in favor of the protesters, however, cannot be
viewed as the end of RICO's expansion. First, the Second Circuit
has been one of the few courts to oppose RICO expansion; the
result may have been different in many other circuits. 7 Second,
even the judges within the panel for Town of West Hartford could
not agree. In her dissent, Judge Kease argued that the town's
assertion that it had been forced to pay extra money to its em-
ployees was not substantially different from an assertion that it
had been forced to hire extra employees; the latter characteriza-
tion would have been considered property within the Hobbs
Act.' These facts resemble those in McMonagle, in which dam-
ages were based on the clinic's increased security costs. 139
Viewed from this perspective, it is difficult to see why the munici-
pality was not entitled to recover its increased costs.'4 In a more
RICO-friendly court, the decision probably would have been dif-
ferent.
3. Fear. In the protest context, the fear element is the most
difficult to apply. Simple picketing, for example, can hardly be said
to be threatening in any physical sense. It could be viewed,
however, as a threat to the ability of a business to attract
136. Id. at 102.
137. The Second Circuit has been a long-time advocate of limiting RICO. It applied
an economic motive requirement in United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 59 (2d Cir. 1983),
and required proof of criminal convictions and of a "racketeering injury" separate from
the injury of the predicate act in Sedima, S.P.RL. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 496, 503
(2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 473 U.S. 479 (1985). Judge Mahoney may have summed it up best
in West Hartford when he admonished that the court's willingness to enforce RICO as
written by Congress "does not imply.., any disposition on the part of this court to
countenance fanciful invocations of the draconian RICO weapon in civil litigation." 915
F.2d at 104. Other courts are more open to such innovative applications by plaintiffs. See,
e.g., Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 901 (1989); National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994).
138. West Hartford, 915 F.2d at 105; see supra Section I(C).
139. Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 689 F. Supp. 465, 476 (E.D. Pa.
1988), affd, 868 F.2d 1342 (3d Cir. 1989), cert denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989).
140. The West Hartford court based its reasoning in large measure on a comparison
to Clayton Act decisions that only permitted a government to recover when injured in its
commercial interests. West Hartford, 915 F.2d at 103-04. The decision to view the town's
definite, liquidated overtime costs as more closely related to injuries to a state's general
economy than as particular commercial transactions seems to reflect the court's bias
against RICO rather than careful reasoning.
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customers and to continue operating. Yet, even in that context, the
usual picketing lacks what one commentator has termed the "im-
perative quality" present in the more typical extortion scheme. a4'
The difficulty for courts is ensuring that the protesters have acted
beyond their rights under the First Amendment. The general
principle involved is that while the First Amendment protects
speech (including coercive and offensive speech), 42 the right to
free speech "does not offer a sanctuary for violators [of the
law]."143
The McMonagle case provides the paradigmatic fact pattern.
There, the district court found four separate "trespasses" that
precipitated the tortious and extortionate acts.'" On the first oc-
casion, protesters entered the clinic, blocking access to some of the
rooms and throwing medical supplies to the floor. 45 One em-
ployee testified that she was injured while trying to prevent the
protesters' entry and that she subsequently quit her job until the
clinic installed a more sophisticated security system.' 46 The next
two incidents occurred over a year later when about a dozen pro-
testers entered the clinic again, this time locking themselves in an
operating room, and damaging and taking medical equipment.'47
Six months later the fourth event followed: Demonstrators were
videotaped "sitting down on the floor of a waiting room inside the
clinic, standing in front of patients awaiting services and castigating
them, and ignoring repeated requests that they cease trespassing
and leave the building."'" The circuit court further described tes-
timony that it regarded as addressing the extortion and fear ques-
tions:
[A]n assistant district attorney who witnessed a demonstration
testified that the demonstrators' activity rose to a "frenzy" and
that he delayed leaving the Center out of fear for his physical
safety.... A protester is recorded stating, "I bet you ten to one
this place doesn't last six months." Another added, "This place is
going to be shut down." [Finally, t]hree employees testified that
141. Califa, supra note 84, at 828 n.122.
142. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911 (1982).
143. McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1349 (quoting district court's charge to jury).
144. Id. at 1345-46.
145. Id. at 1345.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1346.
148. Id.
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they were repeatedly subjected to picketing at their homes. Two
of these employees stated that they resigned from their positions
at the Center because of Defendants' actions at their homes and
the Center. 49
The circuit court went on to approve of the trial judge's jury in-
struction that the protesters had a constitutional right to persuade
the clinic to stop performing abortions, the employees to stop
working at the Center, and the patients not to have abor-
tions-even if some of their protests were coercive or offen-
sive. '5 But, as the court reasoned, the same Constitution which
protected the protesters' acts also protected the Center's right to
perform abortions and the patients' rights to receive them; it did
not offer sanctuary for violators.' In light of these precise in-
structions, the Third Circuit asserted with confidence that the jury
award of damages "establishes that the jury found that Defen-
dants' actions went beyond mere dissent and publication of their
political views."'52
This decision poses the difficult question of identifying at what
point the protesters crossed the line from protected protest to
Hobbs Act and RICO violations. One commentator has suggested
that the protesters crossed the line when they combined coercive
speech and trespass.'53 Trespass is clearly not protected by the
Constitution, but it is difficult to see how this criminal act changes
the speech from noncriminal to extortionate. While the physical
location of the speaker may make the speech more intrusive and
immediate, its essential character is not altered.
The "speech-plus-trespass" justification also might be ex-
plained if the coercive speech is extortionate wherever the speaker
may be. Under this view, whether the protesters are on the public
sidewalk or on the clinic's property, they are attempting to extort
a clinic's right to operate when they threaten to picket and con-
front patients and employees until it ceases performing abortions.
However, as long as the protesters stay on the sidewalk, they are
within the protection of the First Amendment, and no laws, in-
cluding RICO and the Hobbs Act, can touch them. When the pro-
149. Id. at 1346 (citations omitted).
150. a at 1349.
151. Id.
152. Id
153. See Califa, supra note 84, at 828-29 n.122.
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testers exceed their constitutional rights by committing a trespass,
however, they immediately fall within the Hobbs Act.
This view is useful to the debate, but it does not go far
enough. It leaves many forms of protest and civil disobedience,
such as sit-ins, unprotected. While the tenets of civil disobedience
call for submitting to the sanctions of an unjust law, it is contrary
to principles of democratic government to impose RICO's severe
penalties on such activists. Consider, for example, the fact that a
protest that successfully persuades significant numbers of potential
customers from patronizing a store could be liable for three times
the profits the store might have expected if only a few individuals
trespass onto the store's property. Furthermore, this argument
seems to ignore an essential difference between protest and extor-
tion, which should militate against bestowing such a windfall upon
the plaintiff.
B. RICO
Given RICO's vast expansion over the past two decades,
plaintiffs generally have little difficulty bringing protesters within
its statutory parameters. Yet, plaintiffs must generally rely on the
broadest understandings of these requirements, particularly in
meeting the pattern and enterprise requirements.
1. Pattern Requirement. The relatedness half of the pattern
requirement"5 poses little difficulty in the typical case involving
protesters. Indeed, these cases generally involve the same purposes
(stopping the target activity); participants (members of the protest
organization); victims (those engaging in the offensive activity);
and commission (from picketing to trespassing). In short, the
plaintiffs usually have their choice of avenues for meeting this
prong and typically can adjust their pleading to accommodate the
available evidence.
Continuity55 is also a fairly easy element for plaintiffs to
satisfy in the protest context. By their very nature, protest cam-
paigns are long-term affairs. Protesters must be present day in and
day out if their efforts are to have any permanent effect. In
McMonagle, for example, the trespasses occurred over a period of
154. See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
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more than two years; in Scheidler, the plaintiffs catalogued the
protest leaders' activities over as much as six years. 6 When the
protests continue for some extended period, the plaintiffs clearly
can claim to have established close-ended continuity; and when
there is not yet a long history of offenses, as in West Hartford,
there will often be enough evidence available to convince a court
that the activities could continue. 5 7
It might be more difficult to establish a pattern if the Su-
preme Court had adopted the Eighth Circuit's "multiple schemes"
test' or the more complicated multi-factor test of the Seventh
Circuit. 59 Under the current interpretation, however, nearly any
organized protest movement would fit the statutory definition.
2. Enterprise. The enterprise requirement has a mixed history
in the context of RICO's application to protestors. In some cases,
such as McMonagle, the satisfaction of the enterprise requirement
was never an issue."6 Courts and parties alike seem to have
tacitly accepted that the broad requirements of common purpose,
ongoing organization, and separate existence are easily satisfied
when the defendants are part of an organized movement. In other
courts, however, the enterprise requirement has been a shield
protecting protesters from the "draconian RICO weapon"' 6'
through the economic motive requirement. 6 2
But even in the post-Scheidler world, the enterprise require-
ment seems to be the most difficult requirement for RICO plain-
tiffs to meet. Protestors may be able to take steps in order to
avoid RICO liability. Consider the District Court's initial decision
in West Hartford:
156. See McMonagle, 868 F.2d at 1345-46; National Org. for Women v. Scheidler, 968
F.2d 612, 615 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 798, 806 (1994) (cataloguing protest
leaders' activities dating to 1986).
157. Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 371, 373, 375 (D.
Conn. 1989) (finding that two protests had already occurred and that "[t]he Center has
been shown to be a likely target for repetition of the demonstrations."), vacated, 915
F.2d 92 (2d. Cir. 1990).
158. See HJ., Inc., v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 234 (1989).
159. See Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 974-77 (7th Cir. 1986).
160. The satisfaction of the enterprise requirement is not discussed in any of the
McMonagle decisions. See Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, 665 F. Supp.
1147 (E.D. Pa. 1987); McMongle, 868 F.2d at 1342.
161. West Hartford, 915 F.2d at 104.
162. See supra Section II(C).
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[Common Purpose:] On each date, a large number of per-
sons.., blocked the offices of the Center ... for the purpose
of closing down the Center and preventing and discouraging
abortions.163
[Ongoing Organization and Structure:] The demonstration and
rescue was organized, prepared, and orchestrated .... On each
day, from among the demonstrators, one or more persons pre-
sented themselves to officials as "negotiators" authorized to
speak for the arrestees. The arrestees responded to instructions
from negotiators .... There appears to be a substantial associa-
tion of people who are committed to eliminating the availability
of abortions. The association appears to be loose and not
formed.'"
[Separate Existence: G]roups have associated under [various]
names.... Except for Pro-Life, Inc., none is shown to have a
legal status. While Randall Terry has written the "bible" for
rescuers and proclaims a role in "Operation Rescue," [evidence
did not show him] to have had a ... role in either incident....
Defendant Pollock .... was shown to have exercised a leadership
and organizational role in each demonstration."6
These passages illustrate some of the difficulties that can arise in
establishing a RICO enterprise. For example, while a common
purpose can easily be established in any organized protest, it is
more difficult to show that the protesters are acting under any
organized structure. In Town of West Hartford, some individuals
claimed to speak for the group, but the court did not seem con-
vinced that the decisionmaking structure was anything more than
ad hoc." Similarly, the court's findings make it clear that the
protesters' tactic of refusing to carry or provide identification made
it very difficult for either officials or plaintiffs to establish any
consistent membership at the protests. 67
A similar difficulty arises in determining whether the enter-
prise here had any existence separate from that necessary to carry
out the predicate acts. On the one hand, numerous organizations
163. West Hartford, 726 F. Supp. at 373.
164. li at 374-75.
165. Id. at 375.
166. Id. at 374-75.
167. Id.
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were claimed to have been represented at the protest, and yet
only one seems to have had any legal status."6 Similarly, while
Randall Terry was a named defendant, the plaintiffs were unable
to establish his involvement. 169 Finally, although the court did
identify one individual as having had a "leadership" role in all the
protests, 70 it did not discuss whether that person was any more
than a mere co-conspirator.
It may be encouraging for those who oppose the broad appli-
cability of RICO that protestors can avoid liability. From a broad-
er view, however, it should be disturbing that RICO would pro-
duce this effect. It is the ad hoc, amorphous nature of such pro-
tests that may suffice to prevent an enterprise finding. And yet it
is precisely this kind of disorganization and lack of centralized
authority which can turn a peaceful picket into a near riot. By
encouraging protesters to avoid organization, RICO perversely may
encourage exactly the kind of chaos that plaintiffs are employing it
to attack. If RICO were read in a more limited fashion, this type
of chaos could be avoided.
CONCLUSION
Serious constitutional implications exist when extraordinary
damages are made available in the context of political activism. A
long line of cases has protected picketing and political protest
throughout American history.' A tool of RICO's breadth and
power should be of concern to all who may find themselves en-
gaged in protest someday. While today the targets are anti-abor-
tion protesters who have developed a reputation for fanaticism as
well as the use of violence on a few notable occasions, 172 tomor-
row RICO may be applied to other political movements engaged
168. Id. at 376.
169. Id. at 375.
170. Id.
171. See, eg., Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama
ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); ThornhiU v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). For a
more detailed discussion of the First Amendment and civil rights concerns posed by
expanding RICO, see Califa, supra note 84.
172. Susan Faludi, The Antiabortion Crusade of Randall Terry, WASH. POST, Dec. 23,
1989, at C2; Janice Mall, About Women: Harassment of Abortion Clinics Growing, L.A.
TIMEs, Apr. 26, 1987, Part 6, at 8; Laurie Goodstein, Anti-Abortion Violence Escalating at
Clinics, CHICAGO SUN-Tmms, Jan. 20, 1995, at 8.
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in "direct action" tactics, such as environmental, animal rights, and
gay rights activists.
This Note has demonstrated the extreme degree to which
RICO and its predicates must be stretched to reach political pro-
testers. Originally designed as a statute to punish protection scams
and criminal shakedowns, the Hobbs Act has been transformed
into a way to punish picketing. RICO has expanded beyond career
criminals who insidiously buy up legitimate companies to launder
their ill-gotten gains to political activists who proclaim their mes-
sage in the public square. To suggest that the same statutes should
be used to control activities on both ends of the spectrum is ab-
surd. The legal community should consider conducting a simple
survey of the general public that consists of two separate ques-
tions: "Is picketing the same as extortion?" and "Are protesters
racketeers?" Stripped of the intricate legal deconstruction discussed
in this Note, the extent of the double-stretch of RICO becomes
clear. RICO has not yet faced a full-force confrontation with the
First Amendment, but one is clearly coming unless Congress acts
soon.73 It is time to draw a line in the sand before the sand
runs out.
173. Congressional reform of RICO has often been proposed, at least three times in
the past two Congresses, but has never succeeded. See H.R. 3522, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
(1989); Bill to Limit RICO Fails to Reach Floor, 47 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 292, 292-93
(1991); Attempts to Limit RICO Fail Again, 46 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 536, 536-38 (1990).
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